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China and the American Revolution  
Historians are aware that imperial China had ties to the American Revolution. Indeed, James 
Fichter wrote that ‘tea, though an Asian commodity, helped bring about American 
independence.’ Tea, which was shipped from China into Britain and then re-exported to 
Britain’s American colonies, formed part of Britain’s controversial taxation agenda for the 
said colonies during the 1760s and 1770s. Therefore, this commodity was often ridiculed by 
the colonists. Fichter also commented on how post-1783 the newly independent United States 
developed trading relations with China (beforehand they had been largely prevented from 
doing so by Britain’s regulatory Navigation Acts).1 In due course, these American merchants 
proved formidable commercial rivals to their European counterparts trading in the East. The 
impact of the American War (1775-1783) upon British commerce at the Chinese port of 
Canton has also been studied.2  
Yet rarely has this knowledge been brought together into one piece, and therefore this 
article synthesises such work. Moreover, despite being aware of China’s ties to the American 
Revolution and War of Independence, this topic often remains over-looked in many 
textbooks and popular histories of the subject. These publications obviously refer to key 
events such as the 1776 Declaration of Independence. Textbooks also mention how the war 
gradually escalated between 1777 and 1780 to include the French, Spanish and Dutch as 
belligerents against Britain. Henceforth, this clash of European empires generated a ‘war 
beyond America’ reaching the West Indies, Africa and India.3 Yet China – one of the most 
powerful nations during the eighteenth century - is rarely incorporated into these texts. This 
article goes some way towards correcting this oversight. Thus, by highlight China’s ties to the 
origins of the American Revolution, analysing how the war affected British trade at Canton, 
and determining what the consequences were for the Eastern trades after 1783, this article 
further develops the view that the American Revolution had global implications.   
Chinese Tea: A Contributor to Revolution  
The English (later British) East India Company had traded with China since the seventeenth 
century, and enjoyed the monopoly of British trading interests with the East. By the 
eighteenth century Bengal in India was the Company’s primary trading destination, and, 
because of their relative geographical proximities, the southern Chinese port of Canton and 
Bengal became economically aligned. Canton also became the only Chinese port open to 
European commerce by the 1760s. Hence East India Company (EIC) ships sailed between 
both destinations, and the Company also chartered private vessels under special licenses 
between India and China (the country trade). Goods and manufactures from British vessels 
sent to China were used to purchase Chinese silk and tea, which in turn were exported back to 
Britain. From the Chinese perspective, thirteen commercial firms (Hongs) were the sole 
legitimate agents of trade with the Western nations transacting business at Canton. At various 
times these Hongs had formed a guild (Cohong) to strengthen their positions. This guild had 
been disbanded in 1771, but was later resurrected in 1782 and lasted until 1842.4  
By the 1760s the EIC was facing mounting financial difficulties. This was partially 
caused by the organisation’s gradual transformation from being a trading company to a 
military-territorial power with considerable interests in India. Henceforth, Westminster 
passed several pieces of legislation designed to improve the Company’s affairs – admittedly 
with mixed results.5  In the words of one historian, ‘Tea lay at the heart of all these problems’. 
Goods that the Company exported from Bengal were rarely in sufficient demand in China. 
This prevented the profits from these sales in China from being used to purchase larger 
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amounts of tea. To counteract this, the Company shipped bullion to China - which succeeded 
in increasing the amount of Chinese tea being imported into Britain between 1768 and 1772. 
Regardless, this strategy would only prove effective in increasing EIC revenues if British 
domestic consumption of ‘legal’ tea was boosted. Yet teas shipped into Britain on EIC 
vessels were subject to high duties, which in turn encouraged the smuggling of cheaper 
‘illegal’ tea from Mainland Europe into the UK (Mainland European nations imported 
Chinese tea, and this was not subject to high duties). Henceforth, in a bid to increase EIC 
revenues, some British duties on legal teas were removed during the late-1760s. Whilst 
British tea consumption grew between 1767 and 1768, the longer-term results were less 
promising. Between 1768 and 1772 there was no great increase in the amount of tea sold by 
the Company, and hence this commodity stockpiled in warehouses. The inability of the EIC 
to solve this predicament was due to continued importation of tea from Canton, smuggling of 
illegal teas, and problems in America.6   
Although duties on tea had been reduced in Britain in 1767, an import duty was levied 
upon all tea shipped into Britain’s North American colonies. This proved to be a contentious 
decision. In 1765 Westminster had introduced the Stamp Act, which levied duties on printed 
goods in America (London regarded this as a necessary step to ease budgetary pressures 
caused by the Seven Years War of 1756-1763. Since the American colonists had benefited 
from British military protection, London believed that they too should contribute money). 
However, the colonists opposed the Stamp Act claiming that it was ‘taxation without 
representation’ - the settlers were not directly represented at Westminster. In due course 
Britain repealed these stamp duties, but the issue of raising revenue to fill Britain’s financial 
black-hole did not disappear. During the later-1760s the Townshend programme introduced 
additional revenue-raising schemes in the colonies, and again this was not well received by 
the settlers. Thus, in 1770, these newer duties were repealed except for the one on tea (Britain 
sought to retain a symbolic statement of Parliamentary authority over America). The 1773 
Tea Act also changed the way that this commodity was sold in the colonies, attempting to 
under-cut middlemen and thus making tea cheaper in America. Ironically, this re-opened the 
vexed question of taxation without representation. Tea was disliked by many (though not all) 
colonists due to what it supposedly represented – taxation without representation and the 
corruption of monopoly, both of which were viewed as threats to political and economic 
freedom. The Sons of Liberty famously demonstrated their opposition to tea by dumping this 
commodity into Boston Harbour in 1773. In response, London closed Boston until 
compensation for the destroyed merchandise had been paid. Tea encouraged further 
polarisation of opinions. Because of their criticism of the EIC, monopoly, and tea, many 
American Patriots were drawn towards free trade. Conversely, drinking tea in the colonies 
symbolised one’s loyalty to Britain.7 Combined, these factors accelerated the deterioration of 
Anglo-American relations - resulting in warfare in 1775. Thus, whilst the American 
Revolution was caused by several factors, disputes over what Chinese tea represented also 
played a part.8 
The War beyond America   
Initially, this military conflict was confined primarily to North America and the Caribbean, 
and therefore did not spill over to Asia. However, circumstances changed after 1777. That 
year British troops were defeat at Saratoga in upstate New York, which encouraged France to 
ally itself with the American Rebels (Paris sought to avenge its defeat at the hands of Britain 
during the Seven Years War). Then in 1779 and 1780, respectively, the Spanish and Dutch 
empires began fighting the British. Madrid hoped to regain Gibraltar from Britain. Equally, 
London believed that the Netherlands was supplying the US and France with military 
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equipment, and the Dutch were upset by British seizures of their ships. This helped 
precipitate the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Consequently, a conflict that had begun in North 
America now escalated around the globe.  
India – a territory long subject to European imperial rivalry - was the first Asian 
country to be affected by such escalations. When conflict erupted between Britain and France 
(America’s ally) in 1777/1778, the British EIC sought to take advantage of the situation on 
the Subcontinent. The Company’s troops occupied French possessions in India, such as 
Pondicherry. Circumstances intensified in 1780 when Haidar Ali of Mysore (a French ally) 
attacked his pro-British rival the Nawab of Carnatic. Haidar subsequently forced the British 
into embarrassing retreats. Then in 1781 news of the Anglo-Dutch War reached India, and 
several Dutch possessions (including Negapatam in India and Trincomalee in Ceylon) fell to 
the British. Still, in 1782 the French managed to re-take Trincomalee.  
This expansion of the war affected maritime trading routes in the Indian Ocean and 
South China Sea. EIC vessels sailing between Atlantic and Eastern destinations (including 
Canton) had to traverse these war-zones. Shipping patterns necessarily changed as a result. If 
word spread that an enemy vessel was cruising near an intended destination, then other 
vessels altered course.9 Inevitably, British shipping was captured. By 1781 the Dutch were 
posting vessels at the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) to intercept British shipping 
returning from India and China. Any British vessels that were captured were conveyed to 
Dutch Batavia.10 The British also went on the offensive, which included sending vessels on 
scouting missions into Asia waters, and unleashing privateers (private ships of war).11  
By 5 June 1779, news of these developments had reached the British supercargoes -
representatives responsible for overseeing cargo and its sale - at Canton. On that day they 
entered the fall of Pondicherry into their records.12 Furthermore, by December these residents 
received a letter confirming the ‘commotions in Europe and America.’ Most significantly, the 
British at Canton realised that these escalations would directly threaten their business 
prospects. In 1779 the supercargoes wrote that the enemy had sent cruisers ‘chiefly into the 
tract of Chinese and eastern traders…for the capture of ships returning from China’. 13 
Unsurprisingly, Britons at Canton were much relieved to hear of the eventual restoration of 
peace. In summer 1783 Canton received ‘important intelligence’ that the peace preliminaries 
between Britain, France, Spain and USA had been signed at Versailles. 14  Amidst this 
backdrop, there is little evidence in surviving EIC records that the US was directly involved 
in the eastern war. There is only a brief reference to American cargoes being found on a 
Spanish vessel that had been captured near Macao.15 But certainly, a war that had originated 
in America catalysed other conflicts around the globe.  
British Trade at Canton  
The arrival of war in eastern waters affected the long-standing trading relationship between 
Britain and China. Measurement of this economic activity is made challenging by 
considering a wide range of factors, including the number of vessels sailing to Canton, as 
well as the value of imports, exports, and profits. Figures annually fluctuated depending upon 
which criteria were being measured. Nevertheless, there were four general phases to British 
trade at Canton during the period of the American War. Firstly, there was a period of relative 
calm – one might even say growth. Secondly, whilst business continued there were emerging 
problems (including warfare). The result was both good and bad trading years. Thirdly, there 
was a clear decline in commerce towards the end of the war. Finally, in the post-war years 
British trade with Canton still oscillated but gradually recovered.   
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 A range of figures illustrates this broad quadruple pattern, including the total value of 
exports from China by the EIC. This figure initially rose from 625,257 Taels (Chinese 
currency) to 1,486,677 Taels between 1774-75 and 1777-78, respectively. The second phase 
of mixed trade was demonstrated with a reduction to 1,031,278 Taels in 1779-80, and a good 
year with 2,026,042 Taels in 1780-81. The third phase of highly disrupted trade registered in 
1782-83, with a much reduced value of 796,371 Taels. Finally, in the post-war period the 
total value of EIC exports from China improved to reach over 1 million Taels in 1783-84. 
Figures in Pound Sterling confirm the broad quadruple structure. The net profit of the EIC 
upon its China trade (above 4 per cent interest) was valued at £241,646 in 1775-76. The 
following year it had risen to £282,850. The second phase of mixed trade showed profits of 
over £344,000 in 1779-80, reducing to £130,074 profit for 1780-81. Profits then dropped 
significantly in 1781-82 to under £100,000. Figures from the post-war period varied, but 
reached a clear high of over £1,000,000 profit in 1784-85.16 In terms of the number of EIC 
vessels arriving in China per year, it rose from 5 in 1775 to 9 in 1777. A second phase of 
mixed figures witnessed a reduction back down to 5 arrivals in 1779, but also an increase to 
12 in 1780. 1782 heralded the start of the third phase with a major reduction back down to 5 
vessels. Finally, in the post-war years there was a recovery to reach a new high of 19 sailings 
in 1785.17 
Qualitative evidence suggests a relatively benign trading environment in Canton at the 
start of the conflict. Indeed, when the American War commenced in 1775 it had little impact 
in Asia. Granted, at that time the British expressed some trepidation at the rumoured 
reintroduction of the Cohong – but this did not materialise until 1782. Henceforth, the British 
supercargoes at Canton essentially went about their business as usual. This involved dealing 
with matters such as tracking cargoes and preventing damage to merchandise. British records 
for China in 1776 also noted that the ‘books [were] being balanced’.18 
The second phase of mixed trade with profits and losses emerged during the later-
1770s, and continued into the early-1780s. In 1777 a correspondence from Madras, India, to 
the supercargoes in Canton was optimistic: you ‘do not tell us you will be in want of any 
further assistance at present we trust the supplies now sent to you will be sufficient’. 19 
Additionally, there seems to have been positive shipping news. By October 1780 12 British 
ships had already arrived at Canton, and more were expected that season. The same good 
fortune extended to private vessels: ‘The number of Ships from China belonging to the 
Country trade exceeded this year what they were…last…It has indeed been the good fortune 
of the merchants that they have suffered but little since the commencement of the war.’20 
However, there were some problems during these years. In September 1779 the Canton 
supercargoes recorded that there were challenges in India (presumably the spread of warfare), 
and therefore Madras could not send supplies to Canton.21  Consequently, there was less 
money for the British supercargoes at Canton to purchase Chinese goods for export. The most 
pressing problem for the British in China during the late-1770s and early-1780s was the 
outstanding debts owed to them by the Hong. The British attributed this partially to the end of 
the Cohong in 1771. Indeed, the termination of this association had encouraged individuals 
not previously involved in overseas trade to engage in this line of business, hence creating 
‘several bad debts’.22 British residents also blamed these problems upon the ‘folly and vanity’ 
of several Hong merchants, as well as to the ‘oppression’ of the officials who sought revenue 
for their Emperor. Hence in late-1779 the British frigate Sea Horse arrived at Canton, for the 
first of two occasions, with orders to recover these bad debts. The British supercargoes were 
horrified by this, fearing that Chinese officials would either not receive the ship’s captain or 
that they would not answer favourably. Therefore, the supercargoes tried to prevent the Sea 
Horses’ captain from delivering a letter of intent to the Hoppo (superintendent of maritime 
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customs).23 Ultimately, Beijing ruled that the property of the offending Hongs be auctioned 
off with surpluses being forwarded to the British as compensation.24  
By the 1780s, a third phase associated with declining trade manifested itself. One 
factor behind this downturn was the eventual restoration of the Cohong guild in 1782. The 
British supercargoes now complained that ‘Prices are very low comparatively to those which 
might be obtained if it were not for…monopoly…this shows us as in what a far worse 
Situation the Trade is at present than in the time of any former monopoly’.25 But there were 
other factors at work too - namely the expansion of the war. One of the fronts was the ‘War 
on the two coasts’ in India, involving British troops against Mysore and the Marathas (the 
EIC had been engaged in conflict with the latter since 1775). This situation adversely affected 
the British in China, as British troops in India were consuming supplies originally intended 
for Canton.26 Hence the supercargoes in China had to endure a ‘want of funds’, which meant 
that they could not purchase goods and ‘the Company’s Trade [was] in danger of great 
Embarrassment.’27 Nor was the Dutch war well-received. Some British vessels were sailing 
home from the East ‘totally unacquainted’ with the outbreak of these particular hostilities. 
Unsurprisingly, this ‘greatly alarmed…English merchants’.28 At Canton itself there was a 
decrease in the country trade, occasioned by the ‘great Expense and risk which attends 
Navigation’. This was a reference to the increased cost of maritime insurance during wartime. 
Equally, the British supercargoes at Canton faced stiff competition from European powers 
that were neutral during the American War. British supercargoes angrily noted that the Danes 
and Swedes ‘will not fix Terms until we declare ours, that they may take the advantage of 
offering a penny more, or four or six months shorter period in their Bills.’29  
The British response to this potentially disastrous situation was varied. One approach 
was to request additional convoy provision for vessels sailing to Canton. But in late-1781 
British Admiral Hughes refused to send his vessels to convoy Britain’s China ships through 
the Straits of Malacca, fearing the risks of separating his squadron whilst confronting both the 
French and Dutch fleets.30 The supercargoes also sought renewed financial assistance from 
India, but on 2 November 1782 the supercargoes acknowledged that virtually ‘no assistance 
can be expected from’ India due to the war. So, the British supercargoes purchased Chinese 
items in bulk - but due to the absence of shipping these cargoes were ‘laying on hand to their 
great detriment’. An indication of how precarious the situation had become was that the 
British were prepared to sell Opium in China. Granted, British China merchants had sold this 
substance since the 1750s – but it was frowned upon by Chinese authorities.31  
The fourth and final stage marked a gradual recovery in British trade with China 
during the post-war years. Granted, this did not happen smoothly. In 1784 British 
supercargoes lamented that the ‘situation [in Canton] is intolerable…The management of the 
European trade lies entirely in the mercenary hands of a company called the Con-hang. It is 
composed of ten interlopers’.32 There were also fears that the price of Chinese tea would fall 
due to the large stockpiles of the commodity in British and European warehouses. Therefore, 
the British Parliament passed the 1784 Commutation Act – which slashed duties on tea, and 
helped boost tea sales in Britain over the next few years.33  
British interactions with their European Rivals and the Chinese  
Like the British, mainland European powers had traded with China prior to the American 
War. Thus, how did these nations interact with their commercial and military rivals at Canton 
during the war years? There were examples of cordial behaviour, such as the British 
supercargoes meeting their Danish, Swedish and Dutch counterparts to discuss debts.34 But 
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equally there were several instances of controversial behaviour. For example, in 1779 
drunken British sailors insulted the French flag at Canton by cutting it down from the mast.35 
The British also clashed with the Dutch. After the commencement of the Anglo-Dutch War, 
in September 1781 the crew of a British country ship seized a Dutch vessel near Canton. A 
boarding party of 15 men lowered the Dutch colours, and hoisted up the Union Jack.36 Rarely 
did these events escalate much further, as the Chinese simply did not allow it to. During the 
above incident of September 1781, the local authorities deployed troops to prevent the 
captured vessel from departing the port. The Chinese also warned that their ‘Emperor 
[Qianlong] will not suffer…bring[ing] war into his Dominions – and that whoever does so in 
future shall be treated as an enemy.’ Often, the British supercargoes regarded these Chinese 
proclamations as empty threats.37 After all, the Hong still needed to trade with foreign nations 
to supply gifts to the Emperor. Yet the British knew that they should not cross a certain line. 
If an incident involved the loss of life then the supercargoes feared a far harsher Chinese 
response. During another altercation between British and Dutch sailors in 1781, the former 
cut down a flag stand that almost fell into a factory, which might have resulted in several 
deaths. Fortunately, this did not happen and the British realised that they had been very lucky: 
‘extremely bad consequences might have happened had any lives been lost’.38  
The Long-Term Impact of the American War in the East 
By 1783 peace was restored, and the United States achieved its independence. Henceforth, 
American citizens were now free to openly trade with Asia. The following year the Empress 
of China became the first US vessel to reach Canton. As Fichter has pointed out, this ‘new 
U.S. commercial presence was greater, more sustained, and spread across more of the Indies 
than anything that had emanated from North America before’. Yet, ironically, part of the 
reason for this successful American commercial expansion was that the former colonists 
worked with their former colonial masters. British and American traders in Asia were 
obviously competitors, but they also transacted business together.39 
As for the British, despite the loss of the thirteen colonies their global empire 
remained largely intact in 1783. In some respects their Canton trade would improve during 
the post-war environment. The reduction of duties as part of the 1784 Commutation Act 
increased British consumption of tea. Nevertheless, several problems remained. In reducing 
duties on tea, the Westminster government’s revenue from the tea trade declined.  Nor had 
the EIC’s dire financial position improved during the hard-fought years of global warfare. 
Moreover, British traders in China faced several challenges as a result of the Versailles 
Treaty. The British were clearly concerned by the arrival of the Americans in Chinese waters: 
‘several articles that are the products of their country [the US]…sell for as much, if not more, 
than they will require for their returning cargoes…make no doubt that in seven or eight years 
hence they may send as many more, without draining their country of silver.’40 Nor was it 
just the emerging American presence in China that worried British traders. Writing of the 
Portuguese in Macao (who had been effectively neutral during the war): ‘The Trade of Macao 
is…greatly improved from the unavoidable advantages thrown their way by the Dutch 
War…[they are] the most happy for a lucrative commerce they have now purchased three 
large country ships for the Trade to Batavia and the Malay Ports from which the English 
ships must now be excluded.’41 Yet another problem for the British supercargoes at Canton 
was that they had not controlled all Britons in Chinese waters during the war. One such 
individual was Captain John McClary of the country vessel Dadaloy. In May 1781 he seized 
an allegedly Spanish vessel that had departed Macao (this coincided with the war against 
Madrid). Then the owners of the captured vessel claimed that it was Portuguese, and hence 
ineligible as a prize. The Portuguese governor of Macao also demanded its return. This 
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incident created a serious problem for the British supercargoes. On the one hand they sent 
their apologies to the Portuguese, but on the other they stressed that because the Dadaloy was 
a country vessel ‘we do not Pretend any Power over Captain McClary.’ McClary continued to 
prowl Chinese waters, capturing a Dutch vessel later in the year. Predictably, the Dutch 
claimed that this was an illegal act in a neutral port such as Canton. The Chinese also wanted 
McClary restrained. Eventually, the vessel was returned to the Dutch (although McClary did 
not return all of the ship’s contents).42  
Evidently the British in Canton were dispirited: ‘in no part of the world...are English 
subjects…left so devoid of protection.’43 Thus, in attempt to resolve these difficulties the 
British supercargoes sought to establish greater control over country ships - an issue that 
made progress in 1786 by way of parliamentary statute. 44  Moreover, the supercargoes 
considered using greater force in Canton. Fearing for their personal safety, on 20 December 
1781 they wrote: ‘we are driven to Macao by the Chinese and cannot escape from it without 
mortification…should we…be imprisoned by the infatuation of the people of Macao & the 
Chinese refuse interfering; we know of no alternative but using the Force of our ships to 
release us: which is a predicament so highly unbecoming our situation, that we are extremely 
sorry…we should find ourselves in it.’45 Of course, in the short-term there was no realistic 
prospect of the British successfully asserting more influence in China. In 1784 a gunner from 
the British vessel Lady Hughes fired a salute in Canton that accidentally killed some Chinese. 
The man went into hiding, and in a show of strength Chinese officials deployed troops and 
took a British hostage as leverage to force the supercargoes to hand over the gunner. These 
‘uncommonly hard measures’ lasted for several days, and in the end the hostage was released 
unharmed.46 The gunner was also handed over to the Chinese, but was subsequently executed. 
Beijing used this incident to ‘discipline the foreigners’.47 In an attempt to strengthen their 
position in China, Britain also sent delegations to Beijing to discuss the prospect of 
establishing a diplomatic dialogue between both nations. The most famous of these, the 1793 
Macartney Mission, produced little of substance. Instead, China’s Qianlong Emperor asserted 
that ‘We [China] possess all things…and have no use for [Britain’s] manufactures.’48 Thus, it 
would not be until well after the American Revolutionary War that Britain could assert 
greater influence in China. Owing to advances in Britain’s Industrial Revolution and gradual 
Chinese dynastic decline (although imperial China would endure until 1911), Britain would 
defeat China during the 1839-1842 Opium War, and thereafter open several Chinese ports to 
British commerce.49  
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